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Abstract 
This paper investigates the degree of bank competition in the euro area, the U.S. and U.K. 
before and after the recent financial crisis, and revisits the issue whether the introduction 
of EMU and the euro have had any impact on bank competition. The results suggest that 
the level of bank competition converged across euro area countries in the wake of the 
EMU. The recent global financial crisis led to a fall in competition in several countries 
and especially where large credit and housing booms had preceded the crisis..  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The European banking sector has been hit hard by the recent financial crisis. Many banks 
incurred large losses and only managed to stay in business with exceptional support from 
national governments and central banks. Fixing the banking sector and weaning off weak 
banks from public support will require significant restructuring. This process has started in 
several euro-area countries and is supported by EU rules that require restructuring of 
corporations including banks if certain state aid has been provided. Bank restructuring and 
consolidation would also be supported by a healthy competition in the banking sector. This 
paper revisits the issue whether the introduction of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the euro has had any impact on bank competition in the euro area, the U.S. 
and U.K., including by breaking up national banking sectors by size, domestic and foreign 
ownership and commercial versus savings and loans banks. In addition, the degree of bank 
competition before and after the financial crisis is also a main topic of this paper. 
Bank competition has been studied extensively over the past years. Theories suggest that 
increased competition in the financial sector could lower costs, improve efficiency of 
financial intermediation and quality of financial services, promote innovation and, more 
importantly, greater access to finance by nonfinancial sectors and households.  However 
fierce competition may undermine financial stability if banks take excessive risk and invest 
too little in information collection and establishing long-term relationship with their 
customers (Claessens, 2009). Decressin and Kudela (2007) compare the efficiency and 
competition between EU and U.S. banks and find that small European banks tend to be less 
efficient and competitive than their U.S. counterparts. Shaffer (2001) compares banking 
sectors across a number of industrialized countries and shows that markets for banking 
services are either contestable or resemble a Cournot oligopoly in most countries. Bikker and 
Spierdijk (2008) study development in bank competition worldwide over time and find that 
the euro area faced a significant decline in bank competition in recent years, while emerging 
market became more competitive.  They attribute the decline in competition to the increase in 
concentration and bank size and off-balance sheet activities. Claessens and Laeven 
(henceforth CL, 2004, 2005,) further investigate the factors that drive bank competition and 
its impacts on economic growth. Their findings suggest that bank competition is strongly 
correlated with foreign entry and fewer entry and activity restrictions and that a competitive 
financial sector especially benefits sectors or industries that are highly dependent on external 
financing (see, Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
There are several approaches to measure bank competition: financial market concentration, 
the number of banks per million people, the size of banks’ net interest margins, etc. This 
paper uses the H-statistic, developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987, henceforth PR) which has 
been widely used to measure competition in the banking system by investigating the 
4 
 
relationship between a bank’s costs and its revenues. H-statistics are estimated for euro area 
countries, a euro area aggregate, the U.K. and U.S. over the period 1995–2009. For countries 
where sufficient data are available, this paper analyzes the evolution of the competition 
environment over time and compare the differences between groups of banks separated by 
size, business model and ownership.  
Estimation results suggest that the euro area experienced a decline in the bank competition 
after EMU; however competition levels in euro countries seem to have converged in the 
wake of EMU. Following the global financial crisis, bank competition declined further in 
several euro-area countries, especially where large credit and housing booms took place, 
including the U.S. and Spain. In other countries, however, statistically significant changes 
could not yet be detected also because only a few years of data are available since the crisis 
hit.  
Across countries, there is no strong pattern suggesting that large or small banks compete 
harder. In most countries, commercial banks and foreign banks compete somewhat harder 
than savings banks and domestic banks before EMU. However, the differences in the 
competition levels of different bank types and ownership are not significant after EMU. 
This paper is organized in the following manner. Section I provides a review of measures of 
competition, the factors that drive competition and its effects. Section II discusses the 
empirical model and methodology to estimate the competition indicator. Section III presents 
data and empirical results. Section IV concludes. 
A.   Bank Competition: Measurement 
Traditional performance measures and market structure indicators of the financial sector, for 
example, the net interest margin to total assets ratio, the Lerner index, net income to total 
assets ratio, the concentration index and the number of institutions per million people, do not 
necessarily measure competition accurately  and often send conflicting signals. Carbo and 
others (2009) compare the rankings of existing competition indicators for a number of 
European countries, and find that these indicators give conflicting results because they 
measure different aspects of bank activities. The net interest margin is better for analyzing 
traditional banking loan and deposit services; while the return on assets and the Lerner index 
measure both traditional financial services and off-balance sheet activities. Moreover, these 
indicators are also influenced by the country-specific macroeconomic environment, rule of 
law, taxation system and bank specific characteristics, such as leverage and risk preferences 
(Claessens, 2009). 
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Another approach to measuring the degree of competition is to study the actual behavior of 
banks based on empirical industrial organization models. Based on this approach, the PR 
methodology provides a reduced form revenue model to measure the change of marginal 
revenue in response to change in factor prices and has been widely adopted in various 
empirical studies. CL and Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) applied this method to a large sample 
of countries, finding evidence of monopolistic bank competition with varying degree across 
countries.  
B.   Determinants of Competition 
One popular indicator used in empirical research is the market structure, mainly defined as 
the concentration in the market. Many banks and low concentration tend to promote 
competition. However, the structure could be endogenous since firms’ behavior affects 
market structure. CL find that the degree of contestability determines effective competition 
by removing bank entry and exit barriers. Under the assumption of no entry and exit barriers, 
the increase of output price and the corresponding abnormal profits will attract new entrants 
until firms lower prices back to normal profits.  So a concentrated market may still be very 
competitive if banks can easily enter in case of excessive profits. To evaluate the degree of 
contestability, one needs to look into the entry requirement, the entry barriers for foreign 
banks and other factors (Claessens, 2009). CL find that greater foreign entry and fewer 
activity restrictions are important determinants for more competition. Nathan and Neave 
(1989) assess competition in the Canandian banking system and conclude that potential entry 
of competitors forces banks to price competitively. 
Besides contestability, other factors, such as the development of technology, networks and 
economy of scales, moral hazard problems incurred by asymmetric information, and 
preferences of risks are also important in determining the degree of competition (Bikker and 
Spierdijk, 2008). 
C.   Effects of Competition 
Similar to other industries, increased competition in the financial sector could result in lower 
costs, higher efficiency, better quality of financial services and therefore greater access to 
finance by nonfinancial firms and households.  Better access to finance and lower cost of 
capital promote growth of other industries, especially those dependent on external finance 
(Besanko and Thakor (1992), Samaniego (2010)). Some research investigates the linkage 
between bank competition and growth of industries, and shows that financially dependent 
industries grow faster in countries with strong bank competition (CL, 2005).  
However, theory shows that the effects of competition are complex. Advances in technology 
and information process can promote financial system consolidation, which in turn leads to 
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greater distance and less lending to SMEs, i.e. small and median enterprises (Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad, 2005). Intensive competition can also undermine the incentives of 
banks to invest in information collection and long-term relationship lending to avoid costs. 
Increased competition may encourage banks to engage in more risky activities and therefore 
undermine the stability in the financial sector. However, competition is not a necessary 
condition of fragility. A bank run could happen to a monopolist too and one needs to take 
into account the macroeconomic environment and the quality of supervision and regulation 
and legal institutions when evaluating a possible trade-off between stability and competition. 
Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal, (2009)and De Nicolo and Turk Ariss (2010)  do not find much 
evidence for a trade-off between competition and stability.  
II.   THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A.   The Panzar-Rosse Methodology 
PR2 developed a general test for market structure using a reduced form revenue equation, 
which is regarded as a key method of measuring the degree of competition in the new 
empirical industrial organization literature. Based on the profit-maximization equilibrium 
condition, the PR methodology evaluates the relation between costs and revenues to 
determine different market structures: monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect 
competition.  The sum of the factor price elasticities in PR model is:  
߰ ؠ ෍ݓ௜ሺ ߲ܴ߲ݓ௜ሻ/ ܴ                                                    ሺ1ሻ 
where ܴሺ. ሻ is the revenue function, ݓ௜ is the input factor i, so ߰ is the sum of the factor price 
elasticities.  
PR show that in a monopoly market,  ߰ ൑ 0. Since the increase in costs leads to a cut in 
output, and marginal revenue (which is equal to marginal cost) is always positive, the 
increase in input prices results in a fall in total revenue.3 With monopolistic competition, 
0 ൏ ߰ ൑ 1, because firms raise output prices in response to increase in  factor prices, but the 
rise in output price and input price is not one to one, depending on the demand elasticity. The 
higher demand elasticity, the lower market power and higher competition. With perfect 
competition, ߰ ൌ 1, because in the long run, entry and exit will force firms to set output 
prices at the minimum average cost, so the output prices change in the same direction and the 
extent as the factor prices, and the relation of the rise in cost and revenue is one to one.  
                                                 
2 For more details on the PR model, please refer to the appendix. 
3 PR assume demand elasticity is larger than 1. 
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B.   The Model and H-statistic 
PR’s empirical model for testing market structure has been widely used for the banking 
system. This paper uses the following reduced-form bank revenue equation to test the 
competition environment in the banking system for each country independently: 
lnሺ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଶ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଷ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଵ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଶ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯
൅ ߛଷ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯   
൅ ଵܶ כ ሾߙଵ ൅ ߚସ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚହ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚ଺ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛସ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯
൅ ߛହ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛ଺ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯  ሿ
൅ ଶܶ כ ሾߙଶ ൅ ߚ଻ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚ଼ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଽ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛ଻ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯
൅ ߛ଼ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଽ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯ ሿ
൅ ߝ௜௧                                                                                                           ሺ2ሻ 
where i is bank i, and t is year t. In order to compare the competition levels before and after 
the EMU and the recent financial crisis, this equation introduces two time dummies: T1=1 for 
period after EMU (2001-07), T1=0 otherwise; T2=1 for period of the financial crisis (2008-
09), T2=0 otherwise. 4 For sample splits by size, business model and ownership and 
comparisons pre and post EMU, only time dummy T1 is included in the equation. Following 
CL (2004), ௜ܲ௧ is the ratio of gross interest income over total assets as the proxy for output 
price of loans. For robustness check, this paper also uses the ratio of gross interest income 
and other operating income over total assets as the dependent variable ௜ܲ௧ to cover 
noninterest income.  ଵܹ,௜௧ is calculated as the ratio of total interest expenses to total deposits 
and money market funding, as the proxy for input price of deposits; ଶܹ,௜௧ is the ratio of 
personnel expense over total assets, as the proxy for labor cost; ଷܹ,௜௧ is the ratio of other 
operating expenses over total assets, as the proxy for input prices of equipment and other 
fixed capital. ଵܻ,௜௧, ଶܻ,௜௧, and  ଷܻ,௜௧ are the ratio of equity over total assets, the ratio of net loans 
to total assets and the total assets respectively, which are used as the control variables for 
bank specific effects. Bikker, et al (2008) point out that the scaled revenue function 
(including total assets as a control variable) can lead to overestimation of the degree of 
competition in the banking industry. Estimation with an un-scaled revenue function did not 
change the results qualitatively but significance levels were low. To facilitate comparison 
with previous studies, only scaled results are reported in this paper. 
The H-statistic, defined in PR’s model as the sum of factor price elasticities, is : 
                                                 
4 Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), De Bandt and Davis (2000) and Bikker (2004) estimate H-statistics recursively 
over time. A possible complication of such an approach is that H-Statistics are only valid under the assumption 
that markets are in long-run equilibrium which could be at odds with frequent variations in the level of 
competition.  
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ܪ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ݂݋ݎ ݌ݎ݁ ܧܯܷሺ1995 െ 2000ሻ;  
ܪ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ൅ ߚସ ൅ ߚହ ൅ ߚ଺ ݂݋ݎ ݌݋ݏݐ ܧܯܷ ሺ2001 െ 07ሻ; 
ܪ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ൅ ߚ଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ൅ ߚଽ ݂݋ݎ  ݐ݄݁ ݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ሺ2008 െ 09ሻ.  
The interpretation of the H-statistic is the following: under perfect competition, the total 
revenue and total cost rise by the same amount when the input prices increase, while under 
monopoly, the total revenue falls and the marginal cost increases. Therefore, the H-statistic 
should be: ܪ ൏ 0 under monopoly, ܪ ൌ 1 under perfect competition, and 0 ൏ ܪ ൏ 1 under 
monopolistic competition. 
This paper estimates the H-statistic based on the reduced-form bank revenue equation (2) 
using pooled OLS5 for two models: one is estimated with the dependent variable of gross 
interest revenue ratio, and the other one is estimated using gross interest revenue and other 
revenue ratio as the dependent variable. These two models generate close estimates of H-
statistics. The H-statistics used as the indicator of competition of banking system are the 
average of the H-statistics estimated using these two models. 
C.   Equilibrium Test 
Since PR’s model for perfect competition and monopolistic competition is based on the 
assumption of long-run equilibrium, which is tested, following CL by estimating the 
equation: 
lnሺܴܱܣ௜௧ሻ
ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଶ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଷ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଵ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଶ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛଷ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯   
൅ ଵܶ כ ሾߙଵ ൅ ߚସ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚହ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚ଺ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛସ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛହ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯
൅ ߛ଺ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯  ሿ
൅ ଶܶ כ ሾߙଶ ൅ ߚ଻ ln൫ ଵܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚ଼ ln൫ ଶܹ,௜௧൯൅ߚଽ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ln൫ ଷܹ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛ଻ ln൫ ଵܻ,௜௧൯ ൅ ߛ଼ ln൫ ଶܻ,௜௧൯
൅ ߛଽ ln൫ ଷܻ,௜௧൯ ሿ
൅ ߝ௜௧                                                                                                                                     ሺ3ሻ     
where ROA is the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets, as the proxy for returns on bank 
assets. To avoid negative values of returns on assets, the independent variable is calculated as 
lnሺ1 ൅ ܴܱܣ௜௧ሻ. In equilibrium, input prices should not affect returns on total assets. Thus this 
paper tests whether the E-statistics=0 using F-test: 
ܧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ݂݋ݎ ݌ݎ݁ ܧܯܷሺ1995 െ 2000ሻ;  
ܧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ൅ ߚସ ൅ ߚହ ൅ ߚ଺ ݂݋ݎ ݌݋ݏݐ ܧܯܷ ሺ2001 െ 07ሻ; 
                                                 
5 Due to the limited observations for some countries, the fixed effect panel estimation could be inefficient (the 
average number of observations for each bank is very low, e.g. in some cases less than 2, especially when the 
full sample is split into sub-samples. And the Hausman test rejects fixed effects in these cases.). To be 
consistent in the full sample and sub-sample analysis, OLS is preferred. 
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ܧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߚଷ ൅ ߚ଻ ൅ ߚ଼ ൅ ߚଽ ݂݋ݎ ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ ݐ݄݁ ݂݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ሺ2008 െ 09ሻ.  
If the F-test can not reject the null ܧ ൌ 0, then the market is in long run equilibrium. The 
tests suggest that for most countries this condition is not violated6.  
III.   DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.   Data 
The sample includes ten euro area countries, the United Kingdom and the United States 
included as a benchmark. 7  Figure 1 shows some traditional measures of financial 
development for the sample countries. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector as 
percentage of GDP and domestic credit to the private sector over GDP measure a key 
function of financial intermediaries: the channeling of savings to investors. Market 
capitalization over GDP measures the size of stock market. The interest rate spread is an 
indicator of market efficiency. All variables are the average of 2001–07. From the figure we 
can see that domestic credit provided by the banking sector, domestic credit to the private 
sector and market capitalization are positively related with GDP per capita, while the interest 
rate spread is negatively related with it, reflecting that more advanced financial development 
is generally associated with higher efficiency. 
For the variables in the competition and equilibrium tests, this paper uses bank-level annual 
data from BANKSCOPE for the years 1995–2009 and focuses on commercial banks, savings 
banks, and cooperative banks. Other types of financial institutions, including investment 
banks, real estate &mortgage banks, other nonbanking credit institutions, government banks, 
securities firms, bank holding companies and so on, are not included in the sample, because 
their structures and functions are usually different from the traditional financial 
intermediation. Data from consolidated accounts are used if available, otherwise 
unconsolidated accounts are used.  
As discussed in the previous section, the dependent variable is the ratio of gross interest 
revenue to total assets or gross interest revenue and other revenue to total assets. The 
independent variables are: the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market 
funding, personnel expense to total assets, other operating expense to total assets, equity to 
total assets, net loans to total assets and total assets. All variables8 are taken natural 
                                                 
6 Equilibrium test results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
7 The euro area countries in the sample include members since the start in 1999: Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, and Greece which joined in 2001. 
8 We need to be aware that accounting differences across countries (especially with the U.S.) and over time may 
affect the comparability of the accounting data. For example, the Continental model focuses on debt holders, 
while the Anglo-Saxon model favors share holders, which may leads to different emphases on losses/costs or 
(continued…) 
10 
 
logarithms in the estimation models.  Banks for which all major variables are available are 
kept in the sample. Certain outlier rules are applied: the 1st and 99th percentiles of the 
distributions of main variables are eliminated. To obtain an accurate estimation of H-statistic, 
this paper only report results for countries with more than 50 bank-year observations. This 
rule applies particularly to estimations breaking up national banking sectors by size, domestic 
and foreign ownership and commercial versus savings banks. In the full sample regression, 
the largest number of observations is available for the United States, followed by Germany, 
Italy and France with over 2000 bank-year observations (see column (1) and (2) in Table 3 
for the number of observations and banks for each country). Table 1 and 2 show the median 
statistics for each country, and the correlation matrix of major variables for all observations 
in all countries for the period of 1995–2009. 
B.   Results 
The following sub-sections present estimation results for bank competition over time, 
comparisons across banks of different sizes, types and ownership. 
Before and after EMU 
The effect of EMU is studied by dividing the whole period into two sub-periods: 1995–2000, 
and 2001–07.9 Table 3 displays the estimated average H-statistic for each country and a euro 
area aggregate10 for the period of pre EMU (1995–2000), post EMU (2001–07) and post 
crisis (2008-09). Column (3) and (4) report the H-statistic and standard error before EMU for 
each country or region, column (5) and (6) after EMU. Column (9) displays the changes in 
the H-statistics from pre to post EMU period. 
The overall competition level in euro area dropped slightly after EMU, from 0.699 to 0.518 
while competition levels across member countries converged11. The finding that large and 
financially integrated countries or regions tend to exhibit less competitive behavior than 
smaller sectors is in line with others studies, including Bikker and Spierdijk (2008), who also 
                                                                                                                                                       
gains in their statements and therefore possible distortions of the comparisons of H-statistics which are based on 
factor cost elasticities. Although variables are normalized with total assets, and the effects of accounting 
differences on H-statistics are not specifically estimated in this paper, conclusions should be drawn with 
caution. 
9 EMU started in 1999 but the euro entered circulation only in 2002. Estimation results are robust if the sample 
is split in 1999, or 2000. 
10 This paper delete branches of euro banks in other euro countries in the estimations for euro area aggregate to 
avoid double counting. For example, Deutsche is treated as one German bank, notwithstanding it having major 
business abroad. Since consolidated accounts are used if available, this recollection method is reasonable and 
less complicated given the data. 
11 The standard deviation of H-statistics of euro member countries drops from 0.17 before EMU to 0.12 after 
EMU. 
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find some deterioration in competitive behavior over time for Europe’s banks. They argue 
that banks in large and integrated financial markets are pushed by rising capital market 
competition and tend to shift from traditional intermediation to more sophisticated and 
complex products associated with less price competition. While the small decline in the level 
of bank competition for the euro area is statistically significant, it is somewhat smaller than 
the estimates reported by Bikker et al. (2008) using an un-scaled revenue function.  For 
Austria and Germany, a slight increase in the competition level of their banking systems is 
estimated; however, the increase is not statistically significant. The H-statistics in Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy and Netherlands dropped after EMU. At the same time, Spain, the U.K. 
and the U.S. experienced some small but statistically significant improvement in the 
competition level of their banking systems.  
Before and after the recent financial crisis 
The recent financial crisis and possibly corresponding policies seem to have left a strong 
mark on bank competition in many countries, as indicated by the competition indicators 
before and after the crisis for the sample. Using the reduced revenue equation (2), this section 
estimates the H-statistic for each country. The post-crisis period covers year 2008 to 2009. 
Though most countries show equilibrium market structure in the equilibrium test in both 
periods, the results should be treated cautiously as exit and entry of banks in some countries 
signals that the long-run equilibrium characterized by zero profits which is a necessary 
condition for the validity of the H-Statistics could be distorted. 
Column (7) and (8) of Table 3 show the H-statistics after the financial crisis. In the U.S., 
Italy, Germany, Spain and the euro area, bank competition seems to have declined following 
the financial crisis; however the declines in Germany, Italy and euro area are trivial. 
Estimates suggest that in the U.S. and Spain, where large credit and housing booms had 
preceded the crisis, a significant fall in competition following the recent global financial 
crisis may have occurred. While competition in Netherlands shows some increase, other euro 
countries remained broadly unchanged. Finally, these post-crisis estimates only provide 
preliminary evidence in view of the limited number of observations and the fact the structural 
changes in the aftermath of the crisis may distort the long-run market equilibrium necessary 
for validity of the H-Statistic. 
In the following sub-sections, results for bank competition comparisons across banks of 
different sizes, types and ownership are presented. Due to the limited observations in the post 
crisis period in some countries, the over time comparisons of the sample separations are 
made between pre and post EMU periods. 
Bank competition among large and small banks 
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There is no strong pattern suggesting whether large (top 50) or small banks (bottom 50) 
compete harder (see Table 4 for the comparison among banks of different sizes). For some 
countries, like U.S. and U.K., small banks compete more intensively, while larger banks in 
Austria, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain are more competitive before EMU. In other 
countries, the competition indicators of larger banks are not statistically different from those 
of smaller banks before EMU (panel A of table 4). Panel B of table 4 compares competition 
among large and small banks after EMU. Interestingly, small banks show more competitive 
behavior in most countries, except in France and Spain. Panel C compares the changes of 
competition within small and large banks. The euro area, France, Greece, Italy and 
Netherlands have experienced a significant drop in competition in both small and large 
banks, while both banks in the U.S. and U.K. showed a noticeable increase.  
Comparison across bank types 
The sample countries vary in the composition of their banking systems. For some countries, 
including U.S, U.K., Finland, Greece and etc, commercial banks dominate, while in Germany 
and Italy, there are more savings banks and cooperative banks. The sample is divided into 
two groups: savings and cooperative banks, and commercial banks. This section investigates 
selected countries: U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria because other countries 
have a predominant number of one group of banks while lack the other group (see column 
(17)-(20) in table 5 for the number of observations and banks in the sample).  
Before EMU, in Germany, Italy and USA, commercial banks are more competitive than 
savings/corporative banks. After EMU, the differences between commercial banks and 
savings/corporative banks are small and not significant, in most euro countries (except 
Spain), which indicates competition levels of different types of banks after EMU seem to 
converge. For the euro area, commercial banks display higher competition level after EMU. 
In contrast, commercial banks are consistently more competitive in the U.S. over time. Panel 
C in table 5 displays the evolution of H-statistics for two groups of banks. Most euro-area 
countries and the euro area as a whole have seen drops in competition for both types of 
banks, in contrast with improvements in the U.S. 
However, there is no sign suggesting that whole banking systems with more diversified bank 
types compete harder. After comparing the H-statistics of U.S, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Austria with those of other countries in both sub-sample periods for all types of banks 
(see table 3), the average H-statistic of the former group, which has more diversified banking 
system, is lower than that of the later one, and the difference is statistically significant at 5% 
level12.  
Foreign vs. Domestic banks 
                                                 
12 The t-test is not reported, but can be easily computed. 
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Some research indicates that the competition from foreign banks promotes the competition in 
local market.  This paper finds mixed patterns: some domestic markets become more 
competitive over time, while some do not. Foreign banks here are defined to have over 51% 
of foreign ownership.  Due to the limited information from the database, not all banks report 
their global ultimate ownership. In this section, the sample only includes banks which report 
their global ultimate owners and countries with more than 50 bank-year observations in each 
(foreign/domestic) group (see panel C in table 6 for the number of observations and banks). 
Therefore, countries in this section are reduced to: U.S., U.K., France, Italy and Portugal.  
Panels A and B in Table 6 display the results for both foreign and domestic banks before and 
after EMU. In France and U.S., foreign banks compete harder before EMU, but the 
differences between foreign and domestic banks are smaller and not significant after EMU. 
For Italy and Portugal, the competition among foreign banks and domestic banks is not 
significantly different in both periods. From results in panel B, we could see that after EMU, 
the difference in the competition levels between foreign and domestic banks tend be less 
obvious in both Europe and U.S. Panel C of table 6 shows the evolution of H-statistics 
among foreign and domestic banks. In Franc and Italy, both foreign and domestic banks 
regressed (although the fall in domestic banks in Italy is not significant), while foreign banks 
in U.K. and domestic banks in U.S. banking systems improved over time.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
Estimates of bank competition for the euro-area countries, a euro area aggregate and the 
U.K., U.S. suggest that neither the introduction of the euro nor the recent financial crisis has 
had a common impact across countries. The euro area experienced a significant but small 
decline in bank competition after EMU and the financial crisis. Some studies with similar 
findings have attributed the decline in competition to the process of consolidation, and the 
movement of bank activities from traditional financial business to off-balance sheet 
activities. More importantly, competition levels in euro countries seem to have converged 
after EMU, not just at the average national market level, but also between different bank 
types and ownership. Finally, following the financial crisis, competition fell in many 
countries, and especially in some countries where large credit and housing booms took place.  
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APPENDIX: SIMPLIFIED PANZAR-ROSSE MODEL 
Monopoly 
For monopoly market, the firm profits can be written as: 
ߨ ൌ ܴሺݕ, ݖሻ െ ܥሺݕ, ݖ, ݓ, ݐሻ                                                    ሺ1ሻ 
Where  ܴሺݕ, ݖሻ is the revenue function, and ܥሺݕ, ݖ, ݓ, ݐሻ is the firm’s cost function. Here, z is 
a vector of exogenous variables and y is a vector of decision variables in the revenue 
function. In the cost function, w is a vector of input prices, and t is a vector of exogenous 
variables. Let ݕ଴ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௬ሼߨሺݕ, ݖ, ݓ, ݐሻሽ and ݕଵ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௬ሼߨሺݕ, ݖ, ሺ1 ൅ ݄ሻݓ, ݐሻሽ, with 
݄ ൐ 0. Define ܴ଴ ൌ ܴሺݕ଴, ݖሻ ؠ ܴכሺݖ, ݓ, ݐሻ and ܴଵ ൌ ܴሺݕଵ, ݖሻ ؠ ܴכሺݖ, ሺ1 ൅ ݄ሻݓ, ݐሻ. Then 
we can get the following inequality by definition: 
ܴଵ െ ܥሺݕଵ, ሺ1 ൅ ݄ሻݓ, ݐሻ ൒ ܴ଴ െ ܥሺݕ଴, ሺ1 ൅ ݄ሻݓ, ݐሻ           ሺ2ሻ     
Assuming the cost function is linearly homogeneous, after a few simple algebra transitions 
we could easily obtain 
ܴଵ െ ܴ଴
݄ ൌ
ሾܴכሺݖ, ሺ1 ൅ ݄ሻݓ, ݐሻ െ ܴכሺݖ, ݓ, ݐሻሿ
݄ ൑ 0             ሺ3ሻ 
Also assuming the reduced form revenue function is differentiable, (3) yields 
߰כ ؠ ෍ݓ௜ሺ߲ܴ
כ
߲ݓ௜ሻ/ ܴ
כ  ൑ 0                                                     ሺ4ሻ 
as ݄ ՜ 0. 
 
߰כ is the sum of the factor price elasticities, which is non-positive for a profit-maximizing 
monopolist, since the increase in cost leads to cut in output and thus fall in the revenue. 
 
Monopolistic Competition 
In Monopolistic competition, PR assumes that the firms are in long-run equilibrium and earn 
zero economic profit. So the firm profits can be written as: 
ߨ ൌ ܴሺݕ, ො݊, ݖ, ሻ െ ܥሺݕො, ݖ, ݓ, ݐሻ ൌ 0                                                ሺ5ሻ    
where ො݊ and ݕො are the long run equilibrium number of rivals and output, which are defined as 
functions of ݖ, ݓ and ݐ.  
 
Different from monopoly, the demand curve facing a monopolistic competitive firm is 
dependent on the number of rivals, the prices and quantities of the substitute goods in the 
market. The inverse demand function ܲሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ is a function of output (y), the number of 
rivals (n) and other exogenous variables (z). They also assume that డ௉డ௬ ؠ ௬ܲ ൏ 0 and 
డ௉
డ௡ ؠ
௡ܲ ൏ 0, i.e. the demand is decreasing function of its own output and the number of  rivals in 
the market. The demand elasticity facing individual firm, ሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ ؠ െܲ/ሾ௬డ௉డ௬ ሿ , is assumed 
to be non-decreasing function of the number of rivals, i.e. డ௘డ௡ ൌ ሺܲ ௬ܲ௡ െ ௬ܲ ௡ܲሻ/ሾݕ൫ ௬ܲ൯
ଶሿ ൒
0. 
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Letting ܴሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ ൌ ݕܲሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ, the first order condition for the profit function with respect 
to y is: 
ܴ௬ െ ܥ௬ ൌ 0                                                                                        ሺ6ሻ 
Totally differentiating (5) and (6) using Cramer’s Rule, and summing over all inputs, PR 
transforms (4) into: 
෠߰ ൌ ෍ݓ௜ሺ ߲
෠ܴ
߲ݓ௜ሻ/
෠ܴ ൌ 1 ൅ ܴ௬൫ܴ௡ܴ௬ െ ܴ௬௡ܴ൯ൣ ෠ܴ൫ܴ௬௬ െ ܴ௬௬൯ܴ௡൧                           ሺ7ሻ 
where ෠ܴ ൌ ܴሺݕො, ො݊, ݖሻ. 
 
(7) can be rewritten into (8) using ܴሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ ൌ ݕܲሺݕ, ݊, ݖሻ: 
෠߰ ൌ ෍ݓ௜ሺ ߲
෠ܴ
߲ݓ௜ሻ/
෠ܴ ൌ 1 ൅ ܴ௬ሾݕ
ଶ൫ ௡ܲ ௬ܲ െ ௬ܲ௡ܲ൯
ൣ ෠ܴ൫ܴ௬௬ െ ܴ௬௬൯ܴ௡൧   ൑ 1        ሺ8ሻ 
By assumption that  డ௘డ௡ ൒ 0, then ෠߰ ൑ 1, i.e. the sum of elasticities of factor prices for a 
monopolistic competitive firm is less than or equal to unity.   
 
Competitive Market 
In the competitive market, changes input prices will lead to entry and exit in the long run and 
thus affect the output and output price. (5) and (6) can be written into: 
݌௖ݕ௖ െ ܥሺݕ௖, ݓ, ݐሻ ൌ 0                                                                ሺ9ሻ 
and                   ݌௖ െ ܥ௬ሺݕ௖, ݓ, ݐሻ ൌ 0                                                                   ሺ10ሻ 
where ݌௖ and ݕ௖ are defined as the equilibrium price and output in perfect competitive 
market.  
 
Totally differentiating (9) and (10) and using Cramer’s Rule, PR obtains the sum of factor 
price elasticities for the perfect competition: 
߰௖ ൌ ෍ቀݓ௜ܴ௖ቁ ሺ߲ ܴ
௖/߲ݓ௜ሻ ൌ ሾሺ ܥ௬ݕܥ௬௬ሻሺܥ െ ݕܥ௬ሻ ൅ ܥ  ሿ/ܴ
௖   ሺ11ሻ 
where ܴ௖ ؠ ݌௖ሺݓ, ݐሻݕ௖ሺݓ, ݐሻ. Further substituting (9) and (10) into (11), we could get  
 
߰௖ ൌ ෍ቀݓ௜ܴ௖ቁ ሺ߲ ܴ
௖/߲ݓ௜ሻ ൌ 1                                                      ሺ12ሻ 
 
In the competitive equilibrium, the sum of factor price elasticities is equal to unity.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Country 
Gross 
interest 
income 
over 
total 
assets  
Total 
income 
over 
total 
assets 
Total interest 
expenses to 
total deposits 
and money 
market 
funding 
Personnel 
expense 
over total 
assets 
Other 
operating 
expenses 
over 
total 
assets 
Equity 
over 
total 
assets 
Net 
loans to 
total 
assets  
Total 
assets 
('000,000 
USD) 
Austria 0.045 0.077 0.029 0.012 0.008 6.15 57.70 471.09
Finland 0.042 0.072 0.032 0.008 0.010 5.52 56.96 22900.00
France 0.054 0.092 0.037 0.014 0.011 6.39 63.74 3942.03
Germany 0.052 0.088 0.031 0.015 0.010 5.10 62.59 567.64
Greece 0.056 0.100 0.036 0.014 0.012 7.47 59.53 5039.09
Ireland 0.040 0.056 0.042 0.001 0.002 4.86 53.83 15600.00
Italy 0.051 0.092 0.035 0.015 0.013 10.34 63.21 564.45
Netherlands 0.050 0.075 0.049 0.008 0.007 5.28 59.92 16200.00
Portugal 0.059 0.091 0.049 0.010 0.010 5.80 55.54 5915.19
Spain 0.048 0.081 0.029 0.011 0.008 6.97 67.73 6200.13
U.K. 0.056 0.086 0.047 0.009 0.009 7.42 48.43 4854.15
U.S. 0.059 0.103 0.027 0.015 0.013 9.58 65.85 113.53
Note: This table reports the median of major variables for each country. The sample covers the years 1995-2009. Data 
source: BankScope 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix Between Major Variables 
 
 
 
  
Gross 
interest 
income 
over total 
assets 
Total 
income 
over total 
assets
Total interest 
expenses to 
total deposits 
and money 
market 
funding
Personnel 
expense 
over total 
assets
Other 
operating 
expenses 
over total 
assets
Equity 
over total 
assets
Net loans 
to total 
assets 
Total 
assets 
('000,000 
USD)
Gross interest income over 
total assets 
1
Total income over total 
assets
0.8605* 1
Total interest expenses to 
total deposits and money 
market funding
0.5692* 0.2216* 1
Personnel expense over 
total assets
0.1871* 0.4637* -0.2253* 1
Other operating expenses 
over total assets
0.1905* 0.4407* -0.1652* 0.5734* 1
Equity over total assets -0.0273* 0.0489* -0.1176* 0.0772* 0.0229* 1
Net loans to total assets 0.2113* 0.2147* 0.0495* 0.0814* 0.0862* -0.1219* 1
Total assets ('000,000 
USD)
-0.0816* -0.1182* 0.0975* -0.1125* -0.0898* -0.1022* -0.0529* 1
Note: This table reports the correlation matrix between major variables for all observations including all countries in 
the sample for 1995-2009. * significant at 5% level
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Table 3. H-Statistics Over Time 
 
    
# obs. # banks 
Before EMU After EMU After Crisis compare pre and post EMU compare pre and post Crisis 
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E ∆H S.E 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)=(5)-(3) (10) (11)=(7)-(5) (12) 
Austria 751 114 0.583*** 0.0355 0.604*** 0.0273 0.707*** 0.104 0.0209 0.0437 0.103 0.107 
Finland 94 15 0.797*** 0.0966 0.550*** 0.0628 0.647*** 0.0528 -0.247** 0.116 0.0964 0.0793 
France 2,921 359 0.638*** 0.0139 0.584*** 0.0162 0.625*** 0.0504 -0.0544*** 0.0212 0.0414 0.0529 
Germany 6,625 1558 0.432*** 0.0141 0.449*** 0.00956 0.364*** 0.0211 0.0171 0.0166 -0.0849*** 0.0229 
Greece 199 28 0.816*** 0.0780 0.518*** 0.0599 0.385*** 0.0992 -0.298*** 0.0966 -0.133 0.113 
Ireland 144 28 1.020*** 0.161 0.754*** 0.0705 0.589*** 0.125 -0.266 0.172 -0.165 0.144 
Italy 4,776 689 0.878*** 0.0144 0.588*** 0.0130 0.496*** 0.0310 -0.290*** 0.0194 -0.0917*** 0.0334
Netherlands 169 29 0.896*** 0.155 0.407*** 0.0611 0.611*** 0.0833 -0.488*** 0.162 0.204** 0.0976 
Portugal 255 37 0.705*** 0.0401 0.679*** 0.0525 0.849*** 0.170 -0.0254 0.0660 0.170 0.178 
Spain 1,120 164 0.704*** 0.0261 0.795*** 0.0282 0.505*** 0.0509 0.0908** 0.0380 -0.290*** 0.0579 
U.K. 813 137 0.506*** 0.0371 0.647*** 0.0270 0.618*** 0.0467 0.141*** 0.0443 -0.0289 0.0531 
U.S. 82,566 9338 0.309*** 0.00691 0.425*** 0.00258 0.270*** 0.00529 0.116*** 0.00725 -0.155*** 0.00578 
euro area 16,706 2969 0.699*** 0.00645 0.518*** 0.00609 0.444*** 0.0123 -0.182*** 0.00879 -0.0737*** 0.0136 
Note: The table displays the estimated average H-statistics of two reduced-form bank revenue equations using pooled OLS for each country and euro area aggregate independently: 
lnP=α0+β1lnW1+β2lnW2+β3lnW3+γ1lnY1+γ2lnY2+γ3lnY3+T1*(α1+β4lnW1+β5lnW2+β6lnW3+γ4lnY1+γ5lnY2+γ6lnY3)+T2*(α2+β7lnW1+β8lnW2+β9lnW3+γ7lnY1+γ8lnY2+γ9lnY3)+ε. One is estimated 
using gross interest revenue over total assets as dependent variable, the other one using gross revenue (interest and other revenue) over total assets. The sample covers years 1995-2009. The pre EMU 
period is from 1995-2000, post EMU from 2001-07, and post financial crisis from 2008-09. T1,2 are the time dummies for EMU and financial crisis respectively: T1=1 for  for 2001-2007, T1=0, otherwise; 
T2=1 for 2008-09, T2=0, otherwise. H= β1+β2+β3 for pre EMU period, H= β1+β2+β3+β4+β5+β6 for post EMU,   H= β1+β2+β3+β7+β8+β9 for post financial crisis period. Column (9) and (11) display the 
difference in the H-statistic pre and post EMU, i.e. (9)=(5)-(3), and  the H-statistic pre and post financial crisis, i.e. (11)=(7)-(5) . All variables in the estimations are annual data from BankScope. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. H-Statistics of Banking System by Size 
 
 
Panel A: Before EMU 
SMALL LARGE Diff  
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(3)-(1) (6) 
Austria 0.459*** 0.0523 0.714*** 0.0471 0.255*** 0.0698 
Finland 0.840*** 0.0919 0.783*** 0.175 -0.0572 0.196 
France 0.616*** 0.0184 0.675*** 0.0202 0.0582** 0.0271 
Germany 0.447*** 0.0204 0.415*** 0.0210 -0.0319 0.0290 
Greece 0.789*** 0.0960 0.829*** 0.169 0.0399 0.194 
Italy 0.803*** 0.0232 0.929*** 0.0182 0.126*** 0.0295 
Netherlands 1.153*** 0.176 0.837*** 0.287 -0.316 0.337 
Portugal 0.677*** 0.0437 0.858*** 0.0839 0.182* 0.0936 
Spain 0.659*** 0.0319 0.804*** 0.0503 0.145** 0.0593 
U.K. 0.534*** 0.0419 0.406*** 0.0612 -0.128* 0.0730 
U.S. 0.375*** 0.00935 0.245*** 0.00989 -0.130*** 0.0135 
euro area 0.667*** 0.0109 0.706*** 0.00817 0.0394*** 0.0134 
              
Panel B: After EMU 
  SMALL LARGE Diff  
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)=(9)-(7) (12) 
Austria 0.665*** 0.0345 0.543*** 0.0422 -0.122** 0.0535 
Finland 0.709*** 0.134 0.735*** 0.0747 0.0265 0.160 
France 0.534*** 0.0258 0.612*** 0.0207 0.0783** 0.0332 
Germany 0.455*** 0.0151 0.441*** 0.0133 -0.0145 0.0199 
Greece 0.483*** 0.104 0.481*** 0.0811 -0.00129 0.135 
Italy 0.601*** 0.0178 0.587*** 0.0185 -0.0149 0.0256 
Netherlands 0.579*** 0.0766 0.333*** 0.0724 -0.246** 0.100 
Portugal 0.810*** 0.0671 0.455*** 0.0760 -0.354*** 0.102 
Spain 0.739*** 0.0417 0.852*** 0.0405 0.113* 0.0580 
U.K. 0.645*** 0.0364 0.601*** 0.0382 -0.0440 0.0517 
U.S. 0.432*** 0.00367 0.423*** 0.00349 -0.00905* 0.00497 
euro area 0.495*** 0.0110 0.553*** 0.00760 0.0579*** 0.0133 
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Panel C: Compare pre and post EMU 
  SMALL LARGE 
∆H S.E ∆H S.E 
  (13)=(7)-(1) (14) (15)=(9)-(3) (16) 
Austria 0.206*** 0.0616 -0.170*** 0.0626 
Finland -0.131 0.158 -0.0473 0.190 
France -0.0826*** 0.0317 -0.0625** 0.0283 
Germany 0.00799 0.0251 0.0253 0.0244 
Greece -0.306** 0.144 -0.348* 0.190 
Italy -0.202*** 0.0292 -0.342*** 0.0259 
Netherlands -0.574*** 0.188 -0.504* 0.296 
Portugal 0.133* 0.0806 -0.403*** 0.113 
Spain 0.0803 0.0524 0.0481 0.0642 
U.K. 0.112** 0.0546 0.195*** 0.0698 
U.S. 0.0567*** 0.00992 0.178*** 0.0104 
euro area -0.172*** 0.0155 -0.154*** 0.0112 
Note: The table displays the estimated average H-statistics of two reduced-form bank revenue 
equations using pooled OLS for each country and euro area independently: 
lnP=α0+β1lnW1+β2lnW2+β3lnW3+γ1lnY1+γ2lnY2+γ3lnY3+T1*(α1+β4lnW1+β5lnW2+β6lnW3+
γ4lnY1+γ5lnY2+γ6lnY3)+ε. One is estimated using gross interest revenue over total assets as 
dependent variable, the other one using gross revenue (interest and other revenue) over total 
assets. T1 is the time dummy for EMU, T1=0 for 1995-2000, T1=1 for 2001-2007. Column (5) 
and (11) display the difference in the H-statistic between small and large banks before and 
after EMU respectively, i.e. (5)=(3)-(1), (11)=(9)-(7). Column (13) and (15) reports the change in 
H-statistic before and after EMU for small and large banks respectively, i.e. (13)=(7)-(1), 
(15)=(9)-(3). All variables in the estimations are annual data from BankScope. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
23 
 
Table 5. H-Statistics of Banking System by Bank Types 
 
 
 
Panel A: Before EMU 
Commercial Savings/Corporative Diff 
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) (6) 
Austria 0.594*** 0.0400 0.741*** 0.0966 -0.147 0.105 
France 0.632*** 0.0158 0.693*** 0.0288 -0.0610* 0.0324 
Germany 0.609*** 0.0475 0.419*** 0.0148 0.190*** 0.0495 
Italy 0.922*** 0.0248 0.865*** 0.0172 0.0571* 0.0302 
Spain 0.640*** 0.0443 0.859*** 0.0334 -0.219*** 0.0550 
U.S. 0.359*** 0.00722 0.239*** 0.0192 0.120*** 0.0204 
euro area 0.682*** 0.00974 0.721*** 0.00904 -0.0388*** 0.0132 
              
Panel B: After EMU 
  Commercial Savings/Corporative Diff 
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)=(7)-(9) (12) 
Austria 0.608*** 0.0379 0.642*** 0.0456 -0.0342 0.0592 
France 0.572*** 0.0189 0.616*** 0.0336 -0.0436 0.0385 
Germany 0.454*** 0.0325 0.452*** 0.0101 0.00212 0.0340 
Italy 0.587*** 0.0262 0.606*** 0.0149 -0.0195 0.0301 
Spain 0.678*** 0.0400 0.956*** 0.0383 -0.277*** 0.0555 
U.S. 0.437*** 0.00260 0.395*** 0.00799 0.0422*** 0.00833 
euro area 0.584*** 0.0112 0.533*** 0.00833 0.0510*** 0.0139 
    
Panel C: Compare pre and post EMU 
Commercial Savings/Corporative Commercial Savings/Corporative 
∆H S.E ∆H S.E # obs. # banks # obs. # banks
  (13)=(7)-(1) (14) (15)=(9)-(3) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Austria 0.0142 0.0538 -0.0987 0.107 359 52 392 62 
France -0.0594** 0.0245 -0.0769* 0.0436 1396 200 1525 159 
Germany -0.155*** 0.0574 0.0326* 0.0174 177 67 6448 1491 
Italy -0.335*** 0.0360 -0.259*** 0.0228 969 149 3807 540 
Spain 0.0386 0.0596 0.0968** 0.0493 291 59 829 105 
U.S. 0.0780*** 0.00754 0.156*** 0.0207 75217 8411 7349 927 
euro area -0.0987*** 0.0148 -0.189*** 0.0121 3002 498 12987 2356 
Note: The table displays the estimated average H-statistics of two reduced-form bank revenue equations using pooled 
OLS for each country and euro area independently: 
lnP=α0+β1lnW1+β2lnW2+β3lnW3+γ1lnY1+γ2lnY2+γ3lnY3+T1*(α1+β4lnW1+β5lnW2+β6lnW3+γ4lnY1+γ5lnY2+γ6lnY3)+ε. 
One is estimated using gross interest revenue over total assets as dependent variable, the other one using gross revenue 
(interest and other revenue) over total assets. T1 is the time dummy for EMU, T1=0 for 1995-2000, T1=1 for 2001-2007. 
Column (5) and (11) display the difference in the H-statistic between commercial and savings banks before and after 
EMU respectively, i.e. (5)=(3)-(1), (11)=(9)-(7). Column (13) and (15) reports the change in H-statistic before and after 
EMU for commercial and savings banks respectively, i.e. (13)=(7)-(1), (15)=(9)-(3). All variables in the estimations are 
annual data from BankScope. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. H-Statistics of Banking System by Foreign/Domestic Ownership 
 
Panel A: Before EMU 
Foreign  Domestic  Diff  
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) (6) 
France 0.765*** 0.0589 0.626*** 0.0399 0.138* 0.0707 
Italy 0.712*** 0.165 0.924*** 0.0305 -0.212 0.167 
Portugal 0.740*** 0.0921 0.581*** 0.0785 0.159 0.123 
U.K. 0.421*** 0.0439 0.792*** 0.0729 -0.372*** 0.0852 
U.S. 0.431*** 0.0632 0.242*** 0.0279 0.189*** 0.0681 
              
Panel B: After EMU 
Foreign  Domestic Diff 
H-Statistic S.E H-Statistic S.E ∆H S.E 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)=(7)-(9) (12) 
France 0.550*** 0.0519 0.487*** 0.0501 0.0637 0.0723 
Italy 0.638*** 0.109 0.496*** 0.0295 0.142 0.113 
Portugal 0.807*** 0.148 0.712*** 0.0687 0.0945 0.164 
U.K. 0.700*** 0.0351 0.556*** 0.0417 0.144*** 0.0540 
U.S. 0.358*** 0.0358 0.397*** 0.0109 -0.0385 0.0373 
Panel C: compare pre and post EMU 
Foreign  Domestic  Foreign Domestic 
∆H S.E ∆H S.E # obs. # banks # obs. # banks
(13)=(7)-(1) (14) (15)=(9)-(3) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
France -0.214*** 0.0782 -0.140** 0.0630 157 24 491 53 
Italy -0.0741 0.197 -0.428*** 0.0417 61 7 889 100 
Portugal 0.0666 0.173 0.131 0.106 50 6 80 11 
U.K. 0.280*** 0.0548 -0.236*** 0.0816 334 59 336 47 
U.S. -0.0725 0.0720 0.155*** 0.0298 406 45 4811 515 
Note: The table displays the estimated average H-statistics of two reduced-form bank revenue equations using pooled 
OLS for each country independently: 
lnP=α0+β1lnW1+β2lnW2+β3lnW3+γ1lnY1+γ2lnY2+γ3lnY3+T1*(α1+β4lnW1+β5lnW2+β6lnW3+γ4lnY1+γ5lnY2+γ6lnY3)+ε. 
One is estimated using gross interest revenue over total assets as dependent variable, the other one using gross revenue 
(interest and other revenue) over total assets. T1 is the time dummy for EMU, T1=0 for 1995-2000, T1=1 for 2001-2007. 
Column (5) and (11) display the difference in the H-statistic between foreign and domestic banks before and after EMU 
respectively, i.e. (5)=(3)-(1), (11)=(9)-(7). Column (13) and (15) reports the change in H-statistic before and after EMU for 
foreign and domestic banks respectively, i.e. (13)=(7)-(1), (15)=(9)-(3). All variables in the estimations are annual data 
from BankScope. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Traditional Measures of Financial Development across Countries 
 
Note: All variables are the average of 2001-07. Countries in the interest rate spread graph are not 
inclusive due to the lack of data. Data source: International Financial Statistics.  
 
 
 
 
